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Comment
Triggering One-Year Limitations on
Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 Actions:
Actual or Inquiry Discovery?
Securities fraud lawsuits under Rule lOb-5 are governed by the
one- and three-year limitative period in section 9(e) of the Securi-
ties Exchange Act. The one-year period is triggered by the plain-
tiffs discovery of the facts constituting the violation. Courts differ,
however, on the correct discovery standard for section 9(e). This
Comment addresses whether courts should apply an inquiry notice
standard or an actual notice standard to trigger the one-year limi-
tative period.
INTRODUCTION
A limitative period is a time limit for bringing a lawsuit. A person
with a cause of action must bring suit within the limitative period or
be barred from asserting the claim.' Limitative periods strike a bal-
ance between the interests of claimants and the interests of defend-
ants. Claimants have a specified period to discover and assert their
1. The distinction between statutes of limitation and statutes of repose is fine and
often unobserved. Nevertheless, its observance is important to the accurate analysis of
limitations on actions. In general, a limitative period begins to run when the cause of
action accrues; that is, when the plaintiff becomes entitled to maintain suit. The status of
the plaintiff (unawareness or other disability) may toll the running of the statute. A
statute of repose establishes an absolute bar to the action after a fixed period which is
claims, a convention that encourages claimants to investigate and
bring actions promptly. Defendants have the benefit of eventual re-
lief from the threat of liability if the claimant fails to assert a claim
within the limitative period.2 Limitative periods prevent plaintiffs
from unfairly disadvantaging or surprising defendants by bringing
"stale" claims from long in the past so that evidence and witnesses
are no longer available and memories have become unreliable.3
Usually, the limitative period to be applied to a cause of action is
clear because it is explicitly included in a statute creating the cause
of action or in a general "statute of limitations" enumerating limita-
tive periods for various causes of action. A problem arises, however,
when the limitations period applicable to a particular cause of action
is neither expressed by statute nor otherwise apparent. Such is the
case with claims originating under section 10(b) of Securities Ex-
change Act of 19344 and its attendant Rule lOb-5,3 promulgated
thereunder. Section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 contain broad proscrip-
tions against fraud, manipulation, and deception in connection with
the purchase and sale of securities. 6 The language is proscriptive, but
usually triggered by some occurrence (other than accrual), and which generally runs
despite the status of the plaintiff. For a detailed comparison between statutes of limita-
tion and statutes of repose, see 1 CALVIN W. CORMAN, LIMITATION OF AcTIONS §§ 1.1,
1.3.2. (4th ed. 1991). For a practical approach to litigating both, see generally ADOLF J.
LEVY. SOLVING STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS PROBLEMS (1987).
2. For a general discussion of statutes of limitations and policies, see 1 CORMAN,
supra note 1, § 1.1.
3. Id.
4. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1988). For clarity, the Securities Act of 1933 and the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 are referred to as "the 1933 Act" and "the 1934 Act,"
respectively.
5. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1988).
6. Section 10 of the 1934 Act provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange -
(a) To effect a short sale, or to use or employ any stop-loss order in connection
with the purchase or sale, of any security registered on a national securities
exchange, in contravention of such rules and regulations as the [Securities and
Exchange] Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the public
interest or for the protection of investors.
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security
registered on a national securities exchange or any security not so registered,
any manipulative or deceptive device or contrivance in contravention of such
rules and regulations as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appro-
priate in the public interest or for the protection of investors.
15 U.S.C. § 78j. Rule lOb-5, promulgated under section 10(b), provides:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the use of any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the mails, or of any
facility of any national securities exchange,
(1) to employ any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(2) to make any untrue statement of a material fact or to omit to state a mate-
rial fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in the light of the
circumstances under which they were made, not misleading, or
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10(b) does not grant an express right of action as do other portions
of the Act. To effectuate the purposes of section 10(b) and Rule
lOb-5, however, courts have for many years recognized an implied
right of action.'
Implied causes of action, because judicially recognized, do not
come with statutes of limitations. In the absence of legislative revi-
sion, then, courts are left searching for limitative periods to apply to
the rights of action they have created. Recently, the United States
Supreme Court held, in Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow
v. Gilbertson,s that the limitative period applicable to 10(b) and
Rule lOb-5 claims is found in section 9(e)9 of the 1934 Act.
The Lampf decision was remarkable for several reasons. First, it
settled a circuit court split on the issue of whether the limitations
period for 10b actions should come from a federal or a state source.
Second, it settled another split by selecting a particular section of
federal law, section 9(e), to apply to 10(b) claims. Third, it created
disruption by applying its holding retroactively to existing cases.
Retroactive application required many pending cases to be dismissed
as having been untimely under section 9(e), though they were ini-
tially deemed timely under prior law. 10
The focus of this Comment is on a less obvious implication of
Lampf. In settling the existing circuit splits by selecting section 9(e),
the Lampf Court initiated a new emerging split over the proper "dis-
covery standard" for triggering the one-year limitations period con-
tained in section 9(e).
Section 9 proscribes manipulation of security prices'1 and sets
forth an express right of action for those injured by willful violation
of its provisions.' 2 Such actions are limited, however; section 9(e)
mandates that they must be brought within a year after the plaintiff
(3) to engage in any act, practice, or course of business which operates or
would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person,
in connection with the purchase and sale of any security.
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
7. That there is an implied cause of action under Rule lob-5 was first suggested
in 1946 in Kardon v. National Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512, 513-14 (E.D. Pa. 1946).
8. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2779 (1991).
9. Section 9(e) of the 1934 Act reads, in pertinent part, "No action shall be
maintained to enforce any liability created under this section unless brought within one
year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three years after
such violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e) (1988).
10. This holding sparked congressional response. Congress partially repealed the
retroactivity holding of Lampf by statute. See infra note 160.
11. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(a)-(d).
12. 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
"discovers" the "facts constituting the violation" and within three
years of the violation.'" Section 9(e) thus sets forth a "two-tiered"
structure composed of a one-year limitation period triggered by dis-
covery, and a three-year period of repose triggered by the events un-
derlying the claim. Accordingly, should the plaintiff "discover" the
facts constituting the action, the one-year limitation is triggered, and
the claim is barred after a year without reference to the three-year
provision. On the other hand, claims brought after the three-year
period of repose, which is triggered by the last event underlying the
claim, are barred regardless of when the plaintiff discovered the
facts.' 4
Now that the statute of limitations from section 9(e) is to be ap-
plied to 10(b) claims, a new question has arisen over the correct
"discovery standard" for triggering the one-year limitation period: Is
section 9(e) triggered by "inquiry" notice of the facts constituting
the action or by "actual" notice of the facts? Some courts have con-
strued the limitation as triggered when the plaintiff "by exercise of
reasonable diligence, should have discovered" the facts constituting
the action. Other courts have rejected the "reading in" of inquiry
notice and have held that the one-year limitation of section 9(e) is
triggered only by actual discovery, and that a determination as to
whether the plaintiffs were diligent is irrelevant and unnecessary.
The discovery standard issue is complex. Part I of this Comment
will lay the foundation for analysis of the issue by explaining the
Lampf decision and the historical treatment of section 10(b) limita-
tions before Lampf. Part II details the developing circuit split on this
issue. Part III examines the various rationales behind the contrary
holdings, concluding that the better view is that section 9(e) is trig-
gered only by actual notice.
PART I
A. The Traditional Rule - Applying Analogous State
Provisions to Implied Federal Actions
When federal courts recognize an implied right of action, there is
usually no express limitative period for that action. But courts still
apply a limitative period. To determine the appropriate period,
courts have traditionally followed the general rule, inferred from the
13. Id.
14. Note that the running of the three-year period of repose may truncate or pre-
clude the one-year limitation triggered by discovery. If the plaintiff discovers the facts
two months prior to the end of the three-year period, then the plaintiff has two months,
not one year, to bring the claim. See, e.g., Walck v. American Stock Exch., 687 F.2d 778
(3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 942, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1983) (claim
barred when brought more than three years after last event underlying the transaction
and failure to discover during period does not toll limitation).
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Rules of Decision Act, 5 that the court must look to the most analo-
gous cause of action at state law and apply the limitation period
applicable to the state action to the federal action.' 6 The forum state
- the state in which the court sits - usually serves as the source of
state law.' 7
For 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 actions, this approach found courts ap-
plying limitations either from the state securities laws ("blue sky
laws"), state common law fraud provisions, or various other provi-
sions.' 8 Thus some courts found the state blue sky laws more analo-
gous to the 10(b) action because both cover the same subject and
promote the same interest in preventing securities fraud.' 9 Other
courts considered 10(b)'s renown as an "anti-fraud" statute more
compelling, and used limitations from the state statutes covering
fraud because they are more adaptable to the elements of fraud.20
The lack of uniform limitations for claims under 10(b) claims re-
sulted in criticism from academicians,2" the bench,22 and the bar.23
15. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1988). See Campbell v. Haverhill, 155 U.S. 610, 615-16
(1895) (implying that Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts to apply state law
limitations absent contrary provisions of federal law, the source of the action
notwithstanding).
16. See, e.g., DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 158
(1983)(stating general rule before recognizing exception for some federal causes of ac-
tion). For further discussion of DelCostello, see infra text accompanying notes 27-30.
17. 5D ARNOLD S. JACOBS, LITIGATION AND PRACTICE UNDER RULE lOb-5
§ 235.02 at 10-9 (rev. ed. 1993). Note that a different state's law may ultimately be
applied if: (1) the case is transferred to another forum or (2) the forum state has a
"borrowing" statute directing the court to apply another state's law. Id. at 10-11 to 10-
15.
18. Id. at 10-22 to 10-23 (includes a comprehensive listing of various jurisdictions
and the limitative periods typically selected in those states); 1 CORMAN, supra note 1,
§ 4.3.3. Note that the Corman work predates the Lampf decision slightly, but details the
nascent switch to federal statutes of limitations finally adopted for 10(b) actions in
Lampf.
19. 1 CORMAN, supra note 1, § 4.3.3. Generally, these statutes incorporate a two-
year limitation period. This period is shorter than most limitations under analogous state
fraud statutes.
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Hal M. Bateman & Gerald P. Keith, Statutes of Limitations Appli-
cable to Private Actions Under SEC Rule lOb-5: Complexity in Need of Reform, 39
Mo. L. REV. 165, 183 (1974); David S. Ruder & Neil S. Cross, Limitations on Civil
Liability Under Rule lOb-5, 1972 DUKE L.J. 1125, 1142; Stephen P. Schulman, Statutes
of Limitation in lOb-5 Actions: Complication Added to Confusion, 13 WAYNE L. REV.
637 (1967); Gordon W. Stewart, Note, Statutes of Limitation for Rule lOb-5, 39 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 1021 (1982).
22. See discussion infra part I.B.
23. See The ABA Committee on Federal Regulation of Securities, Report of the
Task Force on Statute of Limitations for Implied Actions, 41 Bus. LAW. 645
(1986)[hereinafter ABA Report].
Critics enumerated the difficulties of the traditional approach, in-
cluding the difficulty of choosing between common law fraud and
state blue sky laws, "forum shopping" problems,24 as well as choice
and conflict of law problems.25 Other critics noted that states do not
design their statutes with national interests in mind, and that federal
courts should avoid inconsistency, whenever possible, by not adopting
state limitations unless required by federal policies to do so.20
Shortly, however, the judiciary would develop the tools to address
the problems perceived in applying state statutes of limitations.
B. The Rise of the Exception: Applying Federal Statutes of
Limitations in Some Cases
Despite the general rule directing courts to apply statutes of limi-
tation from analogous state statutes, a line of cases developed in
which federal courts applied analogous federal limitations instead of
less analogous state limitations, under certain circumstances. The
line of cases resulted from the holding, in DelCostello v. Interna-
tional Brotherhood of Teamsters,27 that implied claims under the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) should be governed by limi-
tations from analogous express causes of action from section 10 of
the NLRA.28 The DelCostello court noted the general rule that
when no federal limitation is expressed, federal courts should look to
24. In the limitations context, the "forum shopping" problem arises when plaintiffs
intentionally bring an action in a federal district court sitting in a particular state to take
advantage of its statute of limitations. See, e.g., Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908
F.2d 1385, 1389 (1990) ("This uncertainty and lack of uniformity promote forum shop-
ping by plaintiffs and result in wholly unjustified disparities in the rights of different
parties litigating identical claims in different states. Neither plaintiffs nor defendants can
determine their rights with any certainty.") (citing ABA Report, supra note 23, at 647).
25. See, e.g., Kronfeld v. Advest, Inc., 675 F. Supp. 1449, 1457-58 & n.21
(S.D.N.Y. 1987) (noting possible applicability of 26 separate limitative periods); In re
National Student Mktg. Litig., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 97,926 (D.D.C. 1981) (not-
ing possible applicability of 34 different limitative periods). See also Belleville Shoe, 908
F.2d at 1388, discussed infra, notes 39-46 and accompanying text, in which the court
noted that:
[T]he [federal] securities . . . acts do not apply in the first place unless the
transactions occurred in interstate commerce. At least two state statutes there-
fore could be applied to any case. Courts must use conflict-of-laws principles to
pare the number down to one. Congress enacted a national rule against fraud
because it believed that national law ought to govern multi-state transactions.
Returning to state law to fetch a period of limitations is inconsistent in spirit
with this decision.
Id.
26. 1 CORNIAN, supra note 1, § 4.4 nn.26-28 and accompanying text. Corman re-
lies on the reasoning set forth in Ellen E. Kaulbach, A Functional Approach to Borrow-
ing Limitations Periods for Federal Statutes, 77 CAL. L. REV. 133 (1989).
27. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
28. Section 10 of the National Labor Relations Act is codified at 29 U.S.C. § 160
(1988).
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the "most closely analogous" state period to determine limitations. 29
Still, the court found that it could turn away from state law "when a
rule from elsewhere in federal law clearly provides a closer analogy
than available state statutes, and when the federal policies at stake
and the practicalities of litigation make that rule a significantly more
appropriate vehicle for interstitial lawmaking ...."30
This rationale from DelCostello was applied four years later in
Agency Holding Corp. v. Malley-Duff & Assocs.,31 in which the Su-
preme Court held that civil RICO claims are governed by the statute
of limitations found in the analogous sections of the Clayton Act,
instead of analogous state provisions.32 Some circuits availed them-
selves of these precedents and held that 10b-5 claims are governed
by the limitations periods in various parts of the federal securities
acts.
In In re Data Access Systems Securities Litigation,33 the Third
Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that the one- and three-year lim-
itative periods from the 1934 Act34 are to be applied to lOb-5
claims.35 The court lamented the problems engendered by the appli-
cation of diverse statutes of limitations to 10(b) actions.36 After de-
ciding to apply a federal limitation to 10(b) actions, the court held
that the limitations periods found in section 10(b)'s "companion sec-
tions" in the 1934 Act provided the best limitations period because
the sections had common objectives: full and fair disclosure and the
prevention of fraud. 37 Accordingly, the court chose the language
29. DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 171-72.
30. Id. at 172.
31. 483 U.S. 143 (1987).
32. RICO is codified at 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1968).
33. 843 F.2d. 1537 (3d Cir.) (en bane), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 849 (1988).
34. Id. at 1545-46 (the court discussed the language from sections 9(e), 18(c), and
29(b) of the 1934 Act).
35. Id. at 1550.
36. "The absence of a uniform limitations period in such actions has been de-
scribed by Judge Easterbrook as 'one tottering parapet of a ramshackle edifice. Deciding
what features of state periods of limitation to adopt for which federal statutes wastes
untold hours.'" Id. at 1539-40 (quoting Norris v. Wirtz, 818 F.2d 1329, 1332 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987)). The court continued:
Judge Easterbrook has lamented: Never has the process been more enervating
than in securities law. There are many potentially analogous state statutes,
with variations for different kinds of securities offenses and different circum-
stances that might toll the period of limitations. Both the bar and scholars have
found the subject vexing and have pleaded, with a unanimity rare in the law,
for help.
Id.
37. Id. at 1548. In the words of the court:
from those sections as the uniform limitations period for 10(b)
actions. 38
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals later came to a similar con-
clusion in Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg.39 Noting the general rule
that section 10(b) actions are governed by state limitations, the court
determined that the rule deserved fresh consideration after the hold-
ings in Agency and Del Costello.40 The court also noted that the
Third Circuit had already overturned the rule in the Data Access
case.4" After considering the tremendous difficulties inherent in the
general rule, the court turned to the question of which federal limita-
tion is the appropriate limitation for 10(b) actions.42 The court con-
sidered two possible candidates: section 13 of the 1933 Act,43 and
section 20A 44 of the 1934 Act.4 5 The court selected section 13 be-
cause it addresses the same concerns as section 10(b) and because it
Both section 10(b) and its companion provisions-§9(e) (manipulation of se-
curity prices); §16(b) (profits from purchase and sale of securities within six
months); §18(c) (liability for misleading statements in any application, report,
or filed document); and §29(b) (validity of contract provisions in violation of
Act or regulationi thereunder)-are aimed at the same objectives. All of these
companion provisions, except section 16(b), have a uniform federal limitations
period. All reflect, in common with section 10(b), the purpose of the original
Securities Act of 1933: to "provide full and fair disclosure of the character of
securities sold in interstate and foreign commerce and through the mails, and
to prevent frauds in the sale thereof, and for other purposes."
Id. (quoting Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores, 421 U.S. 723, 728 (1975)).
38. "[W]e have decided that the proper period of limitations for a complaint
charging violation of section 10(b) and Rule lOb-5 is one year after the plaintiff discov-
ers the facts constituting the violation, and in no event more than three years after such
violation." Id. at 1550.
39. 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990).
40. Id. at 1388. See supra text accompanying notes 27-32 for discussion of Agency
and DelCostello.
41. Id. at 1388. The court apparently misstated the holding in that case: "The
third circuit . . . concluded that §13 of the '33 Act is the appropriate statute." Id. In
fact, the Data Access court found the appropriate limitations in the various sections of
the 1934 Act. See supra notes 33-38 and accompanying text.
42. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1388-90.
43. Section 13 of the 1933 Act provides:
No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under section 11
[15 U.S.C. § 77k] or section 12(2) [15 U.S.C. § 771(2)] unless brought within
one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the omission, or after
such discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
or, if the action is to enforce a liability created under section 12(1) [15 U.S.C.
§ 771(1)] unless brought within one year of the violation upon which it is
based. In no event shall any such action be brought to enforce a liability cre-
ated under section I 1 or section 12(1) more than three years after the security
was bona fide offered to the public, or under section 12(2) more than three
years after the sale.
15 U.S.C. § 77m (1990).
44. Section 20A(b)(4) of the 1934 Act, added by the Insider Trading and Securi-
ties Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, provides that "No action may be brought under
this section more than 5 years after the date of the last transaction that is the subject of
the violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(B)(4) (1988).
45. Belleville Shoe, 908 F.2d at 1390.
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incorporates a period of repose past which the period cannot be
tolled. 6
At about the same time as the Belleville Shoe decision, the Sec-
ond Circuit followed the lead of the Third and Seventh Circuits and
rejected the general rule.4 7 Following the analyses by the Data Ac-
cess and Belleville Shoe courts,48 the Ceres court determined that a
uniform federal limitations period for 10(b) claims would be prefera-
ble to the general rule of using state statutes of limitation.4 9 Survey-
ing the various limitative provisions in the securities acts, the court
settled upon the language from section 9(e) of the 1934 Act as the
limitative period for 10(b) claims.5 0
C. Lampf
The sharp split between circuit courts on whether 10(b) claims are
governed by state or federal limitations brought on Supreme Court
intervention in Lampf.5 1 In Lampf, the plaintiffs brought 10(b) and
46. Id. at 1391-92. The court was most impressed with the necessity for a limita-
tion incorporating a repose period:
The difference between statutes of limitations and statutes of repose is substan-
tial in securities litigation .... All of the express provisions in the '33 and '34
Acts (other than §20A), are drawn as statutes of repose, and deliberately so.
Prices of securities are volatile. If suit may be postponed indefinitely on equita-
ble grounds, then investors may gamble with other people's money .... In-
vestors then have a more powerful incentive to investigate rather than accept
another person's word without question .... Prudent investors almost always
can sniff out fraud (or enough smoke to justify litigation) within three years.
Section 13 cuts off only the claims of the most trusting or somnolent - or the
most wily, those who wanted to wait as long as possible.
Id. at 1392.
47. Ceres Partners v. GEL Assocs., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).
48. Just as the Belleville Shoe court apparently misconstrued the holding of the
Data Access case (see discussion supra note 41), the Ceres court apparently miscon-
strued the holding in Belleville Shoe: "The [Belleville Shoe] court concluded that resort
to state law was thus inappropriate for claims under § 10(b) and Rule lob-5 and that a
more appropriate analogy was to be found in the 1934 Act itself." Id. at 359. In fact, the
Belleville Shoe court chose section 13, found in the 1933 Act. See supra notes 43-45 and
accompanying text.
49. Id. at 360.
50. The court concluded that:
[T]he statute of limitations provided in the 1934 Act for express rights of ac-
tion under [§9(e)] of that Act clearly provides a closer analogy than do availa-
ble state statutes, and that both the federal policies underlying the federal
securities laws and the practicalities of litigation make borrowing of the 1934
Act's one-year/three-year period significantly more appropriate.
Id. at 364.
51. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, III S. Ct. 2773 (1991).
1Ob-5 claims, alleging that misrepresentations in offering memo-
randa induced them to invest in certain limited partnerships. 2 The
plaintiffs asserted that the defendants had assured them that the
partnerships would be profitable and would entitle them to substan-
tial tax benefits.53 The partnerships later failed, and the Internal
Revenue Service denied the plaintiffs' tax benefits.54
The District Court determined that the claims were to be gov-
erned by the limitations period for the most analogous forum state
cause of action, and decided that the appropriate limitations period
was Oregon's two-year limitation on fraud claims.", Because the
court believed the plaintiffs to have been on "inquiry notice" of the
possibility of fraud56 more than two years before bringing the action,
the court granted summary judgment for the defendants, finding
that the claims were not timely filed. 57 The Court of Appeals, agree-
ing that the state fraud law limitation controlled, nevertheless re-
versed and remanded, finding that unresolved facts on the issue of
notice precluded summary judgment. 8
Justice Blackmun, writing for a divided Supreme Court, 9 noted
the difficulties in determining statutes of limitations for federal im-
plied causes of action.60 Then, he announced a new rule for causes of
action implied from federal statutes: courts must look first to similar
express causes of action in the statute of origin for a limitations pe-
riod and should only turn to state analogues when the statute of ori-
gin provides no analogous counterpart to the implied cause of
action.61 Following DelCostello, the Court reasoned that limitations
for similar federal causes of action created by the same statute
hewed more closely to the limitations Congress would intend for the
implied causes of action than limitations borrowed from state law.62
52. Id. at 2776.
53. Id. at 2776-77.
54. Id. at 2776.
55. Id. The Oregon limitation for fraud is codified at Or. Rev. Stat. § 12.110(1)
(1989).
56. The court found that the plaintiffs received reports of the declining financial




59. Justice Scalia wrote an opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judg-
ment. Id. at 2783. Justice Stevens, joined by Justice Souter, dissented. Id. Justice
O'Connor wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Kennedy. Id. at 2785. Justice
Kennedy wrote a dissenting opinion joined by Justice O'Connor. Id. at 2788.
60. Id. at 2780. "In a case such as this, we are faced with the awkward task of
discerning the limitations period that Congress would have intended courts to apply to a
cause of action it really never knew existed." Id.
61. Id. at 2780.
62. "We can imagine no clearer indication of how Congress would have balanced
the policy considerations implicit in any limitations provision than the balance struck by
the same Congress in limiting similar and related protections." Id.
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Applying its newly formed rule to the implied right of action
under 10(b), the Court found that the "contemporaneously enacted
express remedial provisions" of the 1933 and 1934 Acts were
"designed to accommodate a balance of interests very similar" to
those inherent in the 10(b) action.63 Having decided to turn to the
1933 and 1934 Acts, however, the Court still faced a choice between
the various limitative periods scattered throughout both Acts. The
Securities Exchange Commission had urged the use of the five-year
limitation from section 20A, added in 1988 to the 1934 Act, arguing
that it provided Congress' most recent view on securities fraud limi-
tations, and the closest federal analogue.64
The Court rejected this view, noting that most of the express
causes of action in the 1934 Act include "some variation of a 1-year
period after discovery combined with a 3-year period of repose."6,
Further, when adopting the 1934 Act, Congress amended the limita-
tions provision of the 1933 Act to provide one- and three-year limita-
tions for its causes of action.66 Accordingly, the Court found any of
the one- and three-year provisions to be more applicable to 10(b)
claims than the five-year limitation from section 20A.67
Despite its general approval of the one- and three-year limitations
periods, the Court faced another choice between the various one- and
three-year provisions. In announcing the limitative period now appli-
cable to 10(b) claims, the Court used the language from section
9(e) 8 and acknowledged its choice of section 9(e):
The [Securities Exchange] Commission notes, correctly, that the various 1-
and-3-year periods contained in the 1934 and 1933 Acts differ slightly in
terminology. To the extent that these distinctions in the future might prove
significant, we select as the governing standard for an action under § 10(b)
the language of § 9(e) of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e)."9
The Court also used the language of section 9(e) in applying its
new rule to the instant case. Finding that the plaintiff's complaint
63. Id. (citing DelCostello v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 169
(1983)).
64. Id. at 2777-78. See § 20A of the 1934 Act, 15 U.S.C. § 78t-l(b)(4), as added
by § 5 of the Insider Trading and Securities Fraud Enforcement Act of 1988, 102 Stat.
4681 (1988).
65. Id. at 2780 (footnote omitted).
66. Id. at 2780.
67. Id. at 2781.
68. "Litigation instituted pursuant to § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 therefore must be
commenced within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation
and within three years after such violation." (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) Id. at
2782.
69. Id. at 2782 n.9.
was time-barred by the three-year period of repose, the Court re-
fused to apply the doctrine of equitable tolling70 to either the one-
year or the three-year period.7 1 The court found the tolling doctrine
"fundamentally inconsistent" with the one- and three-year structure:
"The 1-year period, by its terms, begins after discovery of the facts
constituting the violation, making tolling unnecessary. The 3-year
limit is a period of repose inconsistent with tolling. ' 2
PART II
INQUIRY OR ACTUAL NOTICE - EMERGING SPLIT
As the Lampf court noted, the various one- and three-year limita-
tions periods found in the securities acts differ in terminology. One
of those differences is that some contain express discovery standards
requiring the plaintiff to exercise some amount of diligence in discov-
ering the fraud alleged.1 3 Under such a "diligence" standard, the
one-year statute of limitations may be triggered before the plaintiff
has actual subjective knowledge of the claim if the plaintiff is found
to be "constructively" aware of the claim because he is placed on
"inquiry notice" of the existence of the facts or the fraud.74
In contrast, the section chosen by the Lampf court as the gov-
erning standard for lOb-5 claims contains no such express diligence
standard.75 This dichotomy has spawned an emerging split on the
proper discovery standard for section 9(e) as applied to Rule 1Ob-5
claims.
The first court to opine on the issue actually did so over a year
70. The Court explained the doctrine of equitable tolling as follows:
"[I]n the usual case, 'where the party injured by the fraud remains in igno-
rance of it without any fault or want of diligence or care on his part, the bar of
the statute does not begin to run until the fraud is discovered, though there be
no special circumstances or efforts on the part of the party committing the
fraud to conceal it from the knowledge of the other party.'"
Id. (quoting Bailey v. Glover, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 342, 348 (1874)). For discussions of
the significance of the equitable tolling doctrine to the issue of the discovery standard,
see infra parts II, III.B.
71. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782.
72. Id. (emphasis added). Lower courts have since found this announcement pro-
bative on the issue of the proper discovery standard for § 9(e). See discussion infra part
II.
73. See, e.g., § 13 of the 1933 Act. It provides: "No action shall be maintained
. . . unless brought within one year after the discovery of the untrue statement or the
omission, or after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasonable dili-
gence . . . ." 15 U.S.C. § 77m (emphasis added).
74. For a discussion and examples of actual and inquiry notice in the securities
fraud context, see 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.03 at 10-59 to 10-68.
75. "No action shall be maintained to enforce any liability created under this sec-
tion, unless brought within one year after the discovery of the facts constituting the viola-
tion and within three years after such violation." 15 U.S.C. § 78i(e).
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before the Lampf decision. Gruber v. Price Waterhouse7 6 arose in
the Third Circuit where the Data Access court had already decided
that Rule 1Ob-5 claims were governed by analogous federal limita-
tions found in section 9(e) of the Exchange Act. An aggrieved
shareholder brought suit against Price Waterhouse for its role in a
public offering that was later the subject of a securities fraud class
action suit. 78 The plaintiff brought claims under section 11, Rule
1Ob-5, and common law fraud and deceit. 9
The District Court had granted summary judgment to Price
Waterhouse on the section 11 claims, finding them time-barred.80
That court refused, however, to grant summary judgment on either
the common law fraud claim or the lOb-5 claim because it found
both governed by the state-law limitations period governing fraud
and deceit, which provides a two-year period.81 Because it was not
clear that Gruber had been on inquiry notice as much as two years
before filing the common law and lOb-5 claims, the District Court
refused to grant summary judgment on those claims.82
Price Waterhouse appealed, arguing that the 1Ob-5 claim should
have been dismissed by retroactive application of the one-year limi-
tation from the Data Access rule and urging that the claim be dis-
missed on the same basis as the section 11 claim: Gruber was on
inquiry notice more than one year before filing the claim.83 Thus, the
main issue in Gruber was whether the District Court erred in refus-
ing to apply the Data Access rule retroactively to the 1Ob-5 claim. 4
Price Waterhouse's argument, however, rested on the assumption
that the 1Ob-5 limitations period would be triggered by Gruber's
constructive knowledge in the same fashion as the section 11 claim.
The Court of Appeals found this assumption erroneous, noting that
the District Court had misstated the Data Access rule to include
inquiry notice:
[T]he district court wrongly stated the Data Access rule by indicating that
"the limitations period found in the Securities Act of 1933, which applies to
76. 911 F.2d 960 (3d Cir. 1990).
77. See supra notes 37-38 and accompanying text.
78. Gruber, 911 F.2d at 962.
79. Id.
80. Id. This is an example of the limitation from § 13 applied; Gruber had inquiry
notice of the facts, triggering the one-year limitation.
81. Id. at 962-63. The state limitative period for fraud and deceit is codified at 42
Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(7) (Purdon Supp. 1989).
82. Gruber, 911 F.2d at 963.
83. Id.
84. Id.
Section 11, also governs the implied causes of action under Section 10(b)
and Rule lOb-5." ....Data Access actually relied upon the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 which does not provide for inquiry notice. (Rather
than "or after discovery should have been made by the exercise of reasona-
ble diligence," the Data Access language provides "and in no event more
than three years after such violation.") 85
Though faulting the District Court's erroneous restatement of the
rule, the Court of Appeals found the error harmless because the rule
would not apply retroactively in the case, and because the District
Court's inquiry notice determination was necessary for the disposi-
tion of the section 11 claim.86 The court was, however, clearly pre-
pared to give effect to the distinction between an express diligence
standard and the lack of such standard in statutory and judicial
language.87
Slightly over a year after the Gruber case, the Lampf Court gave
official imprimatur to the Data Access approach and adopted an
identical formulation of the limitations period, selecting section 9(e)
of the 1934 Act as the governing standard for 10b-5 limitations. 88
Two months later, in Hauman v. Illinois Power Co.,80 a District
Court applied both Gruber and Lampf to hold that the one-year lim-
itation period of section 9(e) can only be triggered by actual, and not
inquiry, notice.
The plaintiffs in Hauman brought a class action against Illinois
Power and its independent accountant Price Waterhouse, asserting
securities fraud claims under section 10(b), as well as state fraud
and negligent misrepresentation claims. 0 The defendants asserted a
statute of limitations defense and moved for summary judgment.9 1
The court denied the motion. 2 On interlocutory appeal, considering
the defendants' motion for reconsideration, the court explained its
reasoning.
The court acknowledged, after lengthy discussion, that the rule
from Lampf would apply retroactively to the case. 3 Nevertheless,
the court concluded that summary judgment was unwarranted be-
cause the one-year limitation from Lampf is not triggered by mere
inquiry notice, and because the defendants had not shown that the
85. Id. at 964 n.4. (emphasis added).
86. Id.
87. If, for example, the court had decided to apply the Data Access rule to the
lOb-5 claim, then the determination of diligence and inquiry notice would presumably be
irrelevant to the lOb-5 claim, and a mere finding of inquiry notice would not trigger the
one-year limitation.
88. See supra part I.C.
89. [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 9 96,882 at 93,600 (C.D. I11.
Aug. 29, 1991).
90. Id. at 93,601.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 93,605.
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plaintiffs had the actual notice required to trigger the one-year
limitation.94
In concluding that the one-year limitation from section 9(e) is
triggered only by actual notice, the court first considered the lan-
guage of section 9(e), particularly in comparison with the language
in section 13:
[The] language in § 9(e) stands in sharp contrast to the language of the
statute of limitations adopted by the Seventh Circuit in Belleville Shoe
.... As the Plaintiffs assert, the differences in the statutory language are
critical. Section 9(e) does not contain the "reasonable diligence" standard
found in § 13 of the Securities Act of 1933. Thus, it seems clear that the
statute of limitations adopted by the Supreme Court for actions under
§ 10(b) begins to run only upon actual discovery of the facts constituting
the fraud, not when the Plaintiffs [were on] inquiry notice.9 5
The court concluded that this construction is consistent with pre-
vailing constructions of section 9(e) at the district and circuit court
levels, including the Gruber court's analysis of the discovery stan-
dard issue.96 Moreover, it held that its interpretation had been "ex-
plicitly endorsed" by the language of the Supreme Court in Lampf 97
Restating the Lampf rule, the court noted that the Lampf Court had
expressly adopted the lafiguage from section 9(e) as the governing
standard by way of acknowledging that the various one- and three-
year periods were distinct and that, where the distinctions were rele-
vant, the language from section 9(e) would control.98 Sections 9(e)
94. Id. at 93,606. The court explained:
Thus, the language of § 9(e), the relevant case law interpreting that section,
and Lampf all require that the one year limitation period does not begin to run
until the plaintiff actually discovers the facts constituting the violation.
In this case, the Defendants have submitted no proof to show that the class
representatives or class plaintiffs actually knew of the facts constituting the
wrong more than one year prior to commencing this suit. Therefore, since the
Plaintiffs' Complaint was filed well within the three year cut off contained in
§ 9(e), this Court must conclude, at least on the present record, that the class
Plaintiffs' § 10(b) claim is timely.
Id.
95. Id. at 93,605.
96. "Also, the Circuit and District Courts which have specifically considered §9(e)
have adhered to a strict interpretation of the relevant statutory language." Id. at 93,606
n.2. (citing Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 911 F.2d 960, 964 n. 4 (3d Cir. 1990); Walck v.
American Stock Exch., Inc., 687 F.2d 778, 791-92 (3d Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S.
942, reh'g denied, 463 U.S. 1236 (1983); Morgan v. Kobrin Sec., Inc., 649 F.Supp.
1023, 1027-28 (N.D. Ill. 1986)).
97. Hauman, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 96,882 at
93,605.
98. Id at 93,605-06.
and 13, though similar, are distinct in their expressed discovery stan-
dards. Accordingly, the Hauman court concluded that that distinc-
tion was critical to the discovery standard analysis, and that the lack
of a diligence standard in section 9(e) implied that actual discovery
is required to trigger the one-year limitation period. 90
The Hauman court also found that the Lampf Court's discussion
of equitable tolling necessarily excluded a diligence standard for sec-
tion 9(e):
[T]he Supreme Court in Lampf held that the doctrine of equitable tolling
does not apply to § 9(e). Since the one year period in § 9(e) begins to run
only when the violation is discovered, the Supreme Court held that tolling is
unnecessary .... This rationale would not apply if diligence and inquiry
notice were relevant considerations. Where the plaintiff's diligence may be
an issue, as under the statute of limitations in § 13 of the Securities Act of
1933, equitable tolling for fraudulent concealment tolls the one year period
until actual discovery. Accordingly, where there is an actual discovery stan-
dard, there is no need to equitably toll the statute.1 °0
The Hauman court thus concluded that the statement in Lampf de-
claring that the one-year limitation begins after discovery, coupled
with the Court's refusal to apply the equitable tolling doctrine to the
one-year period in section 9(e), indicates that section 9(e) is trig-
gered only by actual notice.101
Within two months after Hauman, however, two cases appeared in
which the courts found that inquiry notice is sufficient to trigger the
section 9(e) one-year limitation. Ironically, the courts in both cases
derived their analyses from the same language from Lampf cited in
the Hauman decision.
In Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co.,102 the court considered
whether the plaintiffs' Rule 1Ob-5 claims were barred under the new
statute of limitations rule from Lampf. The court acknowledged that
the Lampf court had chosen section 9(e) from among the various
one- and three-year limitations periods to the extent that the distinc-
tions between them "might prove significant."' 0 3 Nevertheless, the
court focused on the similarities between the sections, concluding
that there is no distinction between the various statutes on the issue
of the discovery standard.10 4 Further, the court asserted that the dis-
tinction was not apparent to the Lampf Court:
99. Id. at 93,606.
100. Id.
101. Id. ("Thus, the language of § 9(e), the relevant case law interpreting that
section, and Lampf all require that the one year limitation period does not begin to run
until the plaintiff actually discovers the facts constituting the violation.").
102. 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1658 (1992).
103. Id. at 898.
104. Id. at 899. ("Despite the [LampAl Court's recognition of the substantial simi-
larity of the wording of these express limitary periods, plaintiffs contend the slightly dif-
ferent wording of § 9(e), in fact, calls for "actual notice" while the language of § 13
requires only inquiry notice. We find no such distinction .... ").
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When the Court selected § 9(e), it did not necessarily indicate a preference
for the type of notice of the violation but sought a "governing" standard to
link the implied § 10(b) remedy to those express securities causes of action
which uniformly require one year after notice of the violation and not more
than three years after the violation.10 5
Convinced that neither Lampf nor the distinctions between section
9(e) and other statutes mandated actual notice, the Anixter court
asserted that the "general rule" for accrual of actions in federal
court is an inquiry standard. 10 6 Accordingly, the court applied sec-
tion 9(e), restating it to include an inquiry notice standard:
[P]laintiffs were required to show their complaint was timely filed within
one year of their notice of the violation, when they knew or should have
known, and no later than three years after the violation. Our previous anal-
ysis of when plaintiffs were on notice of the violation remains applicable to
their 10(b) claims. Indeed, under the analysis set forth in Lampf, Pleva, the
Anixter plaintiffs' 10(b) cause of action is, therefore, untimely filed. 07
To the Anixter court, then, there is only one type of notice -
inquiry notice - whether or not expressed in the language of the
governing statute. The distinction between the express inquiry notice
provision in section 13 and the apparent lack of one in section 9(e)
- a "critical" difference to the Hauman court - is irrelevant be-
cause the "general rule" is that "discovery," however expressed, oc-
curs upon inquiry notice.
At about the same time as Anixter, another court reached the
same conclusion by different means in Berning v. A.G. Edwards &
Sons, Inc."°8 In Berning, the plaintiffs originally faced application of
the section 13 limitation set forth in Short v. Belleville Shoe. 0 9 The
court acknowledged that, since the decision in Lampf, section 9(e)
was the governing standard for 1Ob-5 claims instead of section 13." °
105. Id. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
106. Id. at 899 n.5. The Court stated:
Federal law governs when a cause of action accrues. It would appear that the
general rule for this determination in federal court is an objective test, knows
or should have known; discovers or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should discover, the facts giving rise to the claim. The distinction is often
blurred. For example, in Dzenits v. Merrill, Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith,
Inc., to decide whether the state statute of limitations had run on a 10(b)
claim, the court stated, "The crucial issue of fact with respect to the com-
mencement of the running of the applicable two-year statute of limitations is
when the plaintiff actually knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have known ......
Id. (citations omitted).
107. Anixter, 947 F.2d at 899. (footnote omitted) (emphasis added).
108. 774 F. Supp. 480 (N.D. Ill. 1991).
109. Id. at 481.
110. Id. at 482 n.l.
Still, the court applied an inquiry notice standard in its analysis of
the limitations issue.111
Like the Hauman and Anixter courts, the Berning court began its
analysis of the discovery standard issue by noting that the Lampf
Court had recognized distinctions between the various one- and
three-year statutes and had selected section 9(e) "to the extent that
these distinctions in the future might prove significant."'1 12 In analyz-
ing the distinctions, however, the court focused on what was to be
discovered rather than the discovery standard:
Section 13 of the 1933 Act refers to "discovery of the untrue statement or
the omission," whereas § 9(e) of the 1934 Act refers to "discovery of the
facts constituting the violation." For purposes of the issue presently before
the court, no distinction is found between the terminology of the two
statutes.1 13
As such, the court purported to analyze the statutory distinctions,
but failed to examine the relevant differences in discovery language.
Unsurprisingly, the court found no important distinction in the cited
language, followed Anixter, 14 and decided to apply the same discov-
ery standard for both section 13 and section 9(e).115
In a later case, Manning v. Maloney,"6 the court used an equita-
ble tolling doctrine analysis as the foundation for its conclusion that
the one-year limitation for 10(b) claims is triggered by inquiry no-
tice. In Manning, the plaintiff brought a 10(b) action, among other
actions, relating to his purchase of corporate bonds.11 The court
granted the defendants' motion for dismissal of the claim, finding
111. Id. at 482. ("The first question to address is whether this suit was brought
within one year of discovery. . . .Plaintiffs have the burden of submitting evidence that
they brought suit within one year of discovery and that they remained unaware of the
facts supporting their claim without any fault or want of diligence.") (emphasis added)
(citing Teamsters Local 282 Pension Trust Fund v. Angelos, 815 F.2d 452, 456 (7th Cir.
1987); General Builders Supply Co. v. River Hill Coal Venture, 796 F.2d 8, 12 (1st Cir.
1986); Hupp v. Gray, 500 F.2d 993, 996 (7th Cir. 1974); Hernandez v. Childers, 736 F.
Supp. 903, 908 (N.D. Ill. 1990); Anixter v. Home-Stake Production Co., 939 F.2d 1420,
1437 (10th Cir. 1991)).
112. Id.
113. Id. (footnote omitted).
114. Note, however, that because Anixter was vacated its precedential value is
highly dubious. See, e.g., County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 634 n.6 (1979)
(vacated opinion is devoid of precedential effect); Bennett v. West Tex. State Univ., 799
F.2d 155, 159 n.3 (5th Cir. 1986) (same).
115. Id. at 482-83. The court explained:
"A recent case applies the same discovery standard for both § 13 and §9(e) and
this court will do so as well . . . .Full knowledge of the existence of a claim is
not necessary before the statutory period commences; "inquiry notice" is suffi-
cient . . . .Once a party has reason to be suspicious, the one-year period be-
gins to run . . . . Evidence of the possibility of fraud is sufficient; full
exposition of a scam is not necessary."
Id. (citations omitted).
116. 787 F. Supp. 433 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
117. Id. at 435.
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that the claims were barred by the one-year statute of limitations
from Lampf.118
From the outset, the court noted that the Third Circuit had been
governed by the Lampf rule since the Data Access case in 1988.119
The Manning court stated the Lampf rule, using the language from
section 9(e), but mistakenly cited section 13 as the source of the
rule.120 The court's further analysis proceeded as if section 13 were
the governing standard instead of section 9(e).12' Notwithstanding
this apparent oversight, the court's discussion of equitable doctrines
implies that the court believed that the "discovery" in the Lampf
rule means inquiry discovery:
Equitable tolling under the doctrine of fraudulent concealment does not ap-
ply to [Securities Exchange Act] actions. The one-year "discovery rule" is
the statutory counter-part of the common law doctrine of fraudulent con-
cealment, meaning that the running of both statutes of limitations is trig-
gered by identical considerations: the date on which the plaintiff discovered,
or reasonably should have discovered, the violation.
12
The court's observation that the equitable tolling doctrine does not
apply is clear. However, the subsequent analysis is not. The one-year
"discovery rules" found in the various one- and three-year provisions
of both the 1933 and 1934 Acts are similar to the common law or
equitable doctrine called the "discovery rule."' 2 Further, the rules
118. Id. at 436.
119. Id.
120. Id. ("Claims alleging [a 1934 Act] violation under section 10(b) must be filed
within one year of the discovery of the facts constituting the violation and within three
years of the violation. 15 U.S.C. § 77m.") (citation to Lampf omitted). 15 U.S.C.
§ 77m is section 13 of the 1933 Act, not section 9(e) of the 1934 Act (15 U.S.C. § 78i)
as directed by the holding in Lampf. See Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2782 n.9.
121. Manning, 787 F. Supp. at 436. ("Actions filed beyond the one-year statute of
limitations must be dismissed as untimely. 'Section 13 is substantive, rather than proce-
dural; it establishe[s] an essential ingredient to a private cause of action' . . . . Thus, an
untimely complaint must be dismissed as a matter of law.' ") (quoting Anixter v. Home-
Stake Prod. Co., 939 F.2d 1420, 1434 (10th Cir. 1991)).
122. Manning, 787 F. Supp at 436(emphasis added).
123. The doctrine is described as follows:
Generally, the cause of action accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to
run, at the time of the occurrence of a[n] ... injury or event .... The stat-
ute commences at that time even though the plaintiff is unaware of the accrual
of his or her cause of action.
In an effort to mitigate the potential harshness flowing from this rule, judi-
cial decision has developed an exception. Described as the discovery rule, it
allows the cause of action to accrue when the litigant first knows or with due
diligence should know facts that will form the basis for an action. The rule is
essentially one of equity, which calls for the weighing of the equitable claims of
the parties.
2 CORMAN, supra note 1, § 11.1.1, at 134 (footnotes omitted).
are similar to the equitable tolling doctrine in that they call for dis-
covery (instead of an injury or accrual of the cause of action) to
trigger the one-year limitation. This is predicated in part upon the
notion that fraud is inherently self-concealing; this condition, in eq-
uity, allows a plaintiff to invoke the equitable tolling doctrine to stop
the running of the statute of limitations. 124 Accordingly, the one-year
discovery rules in the 1933 and 1934 Acts are similar to, but are not
coextensive with, the two equitable doctrines.125
But none of this seems to support the Manning court's conclusion
that "both" federal and common law limitations are triggered by in-
quiry notice. The court's conclusion is apparently predicated upon
the following argument. Because the one-year limitations periods are
rooted in equitable doctrines, the same discovery standard applies as
would be applied if the court were applying those doctrines instead
of a statute. Because the relevant equitable doctrines require a dili-
gence analysis, the court concluded that a diligence analysis is re-
quired in determining when the statute is triggered. Hence, "when
the plaintiff discovers" in section 9(e) is to be understood as a sort of
shorthand for "after discovery . ..or after such discovery should
have been made by the exercise of reasonable diligence" in section
13.
Notwithstanding the analyses of the Anixter, Berning, and Man-
ning courts, a District Court in the Second Circuit has, more re-
cently, determined that 9(e) is triggered only by actual notice.128
After determining that the plaintiffs claims were not barred by the
three-year period of repose, the court turned to the one-year limita-
tion: "The issue then is the one-year period from plaintiffs' discovery
of defendants' fraud. That means actual discovery, not when plain-
tiffs might have discovered it by the exercise of due diligence." 27
The Werner court was convinced, as was the Hauman court, that
124. 2 id. § 9.7.1, at 55-56 ("Fraudulent concealment occurs when the defendant
suppresses or misrepresents facts that are the basis of the plaintiff's cause of action; the
plaintiff's awareness of such facts is required to trigger the statute of limitations.").
125. For further discussion of this point and its relevance to the § 9(e) discovery
standard, see infra part III.B.
126. Werner v. Satterlee, Stevens, Burke & Burke, 797 F. Supp. 1196 (S.D.N.Y.
1992).
127. Id. at 1203. The court explained its assertion as follows:
Certainly that is the way the Third Circuit articulated the rule in Data Access,
which the Second Circuit adopted in Ceres. As the Third Circuit subsequently
pointed out in Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, Data Access "relied upon the Se-
curities Exchange Act of 1934 which does not provide for inquiry notice." So
too in Ceres, Judge Kearse's opinion for the Second Circuit looks to §§ 9 and
18(a) of the 1934 Act as source material for the uniform federal limitations
periods in securities cases. §§ 9(e) and 18(c) both speak in terms of "one year
after the discovery of the facts constituting the violation." In Lampf the Su-
preme Court performed the same analysis.
Id. at 1203-04. (citations omitted).
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the Lampf court's refusal to apply the equitable tolling doctrine to
the one-year limitation supports the conclusion that only actual dis-
covery triggers the one-year limitation. The reasoning of these
courts, then, is that because the equitable tolling doctrine is impli-
cated when the plaintiff is ignorant of the facts, a statute triggered
only when the plaintiff is actually aware of the facts by its terms
prevents the statute from being triggered while the plaintiff is igno-
rant. Accordingly, the doctrine is impossible to apply (to toll the
statute) because the statute already incorporates the doctrine by its
express terms. The Werner court followed this reasoning, and held
that only actual notice triggers the one-year limitation.128
Werner is also instructive because of the court's discussion of the
"federal common law" on accrual of actions. The court found that if
the one- and three-year limitation would have acted to bar plaintiffs'
claims, the court would not apply the statute because of equitable
considerations, and would revert to state law limitations .12  As such,
the accrual of the action under state law would be governed by fed-
eral common law, which includes an inquiry discovery standard:
"Under federal common law, the statute of limitations begins to run
'when the plaintiff has actual knowledge of the alleged fraud or
knowledge of facts which in the exercise of reasonable diligence
should have led to actual knowledge.' "130
This may help explain the assertion of the Anixter, Manning, and
Berning courts that the "general" federal rule is an inquiry discovery
standard. However, as the Werner court perceived, this analysis is
limited to federal actions without an express statute of limitations,
for which a state limitation is borrowed; in that case, the running of
the state period is governed by federal law.131 After Lampf, how-
ever, 10(b) actions are governed by express limitations from federal
128. Werner, 797 F. Supp. at 1204. The court expressed puzzlement at judicial
restatements of the rule to include inquiry notice:
I am therefore respectfully puzzled by Judge Newman's statement in Henley,
that Ceres "announced a uniform limitations period of the earlier of one year
from the date the fraud was or reasonably should have been discovered or
three years from the date of the transaction." I understand the one-year period
to run from a plaintiff's actual discovery of fraud, whether or not he should
have discovered it earlier. That construction does not permit fraud claims to
endure forever; they all are subject to the three-year Statute of repose.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Henley v. Slone, 961 F.2d 23, 24 (2d Cir. 1992).
129. Id.
130. Id. at 1204-05.
131. See 2 CORMAN, supra note 1, § 9.7.1, at 66. See also infra notes 165-170 and
accompanying discussion.
law.132 Accordingly, the Werner court used a diligence analysis in
evaluating timeliness under state law, but not under the Lampf
rule.13
Since Werner, one case has arisen in the Ninth Circuit holding
that actual notice is required to trigger the one-year limitation from
section 9(e). T13 In In re Digital Microwave, defendant Arthur An-
derson & Co. raised the one-year limitations defense against the
plaintiffs' 10(b) claims, asserting that the running of the statute is
triggered by inquiry notice.135 The court noted the apparent circuit
split on the issue 36 and concluded that "in the absence of controlling
132. Although, pursuant to decisions on the retroactivity of Lampf, courts still en-
gage in state limitations analysis. See Werner, 797 F. Supp. at 1205.
133. Id. at 1203-05.
134. In re Digital Microwave Corp. Sec. Litig., [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec.
L. Rep. (CCH) % 97,044 at 94,591 (N.D. Cal. 1992).
135. Id. at 94,596. The court stated:
[P]laintiffs contend that the statute of limitations did not begin to run until
their actual discovery of the facts constituting the fraud. [Defendant] contends,
however, that the "general rule" - that the one year statute of limitations be-
gins to run when plaintiffs knew, or should have known, the facts giving rise to
the claim - is applicable in this instance. Thus, a dispute exists as to whether
"inquiry" or "actual" notice is required to begin the running of the statute of
limitations with respect to a securities fraud action.
Id.
136. Id. The court's description of the circuit split deserves qualification:
The Ninth Circuit has not yet addressed the issue since the Lampf decision.
There appears to be a split of authority among the other circuits which have
examined this issue. The Third and Tenth Circuits have determined that "in-
quiry" notice begins the running of the statute [citing Anixter and Manning]
while the Second and Seventh Circuits have found that actual notice is re-
quired [citing Hauman and Werner].
Id. (citations omitted) (transposition of authority in original).
The court cited Manning as the Third Circuit rule. The holding of Manning, however,
is directly contrary to the analysis set forth by the Third Circuit Court of Appeals in the
earlier Gruber case. The rule from Gruber, however, may be obiter dictum because the
court's determination was not actually necessary to the resolution of the case. See supra
note 86 and accompanying text. Nevertheless, the Third Circuit Court of Appeals later
ignored Manning in Westinghouse Elec. Corp. v. Franklin, 993 F.2d 349 (3d Cir. 1993).
The actual or inquiry notice issue was not before the Westinghouse court, but that
court's discussion proceeds as if an actual notice standard applies to § 9(e). Id. at 355,
356. Further, the Westinghouse court cited Gruber with approval on another point. Id. at
354. Actual notice, then, appears to be the standard accepted by the highest authority in
the Third Circuit, Manning notwithstanding.
The Digital Microwave court also cited Werner as the Second Circuit rule. Werner,
however, has since been overruled, sub silentio, by Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36, 41
(2d Cir. 1993).
Further, it is not clear that the vacated Anixter case supplies the rule of the Tenth
Circuit. See supra note 118. However, no contrary authority has yet appeared in that
circuit.
Finally, the Digital Microwave court did not mention that courts in the First Circuit
also require actual notice. See Slavin v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 791 F. Supp 327, 332
(D. Mass 1992) (interpreting Lampf as requiring actual notice for § 9(e)); Heller v.
Arthur D. Little, Inc., 778 F. Supp. 2, 4 (D. Mass 1991) (same).
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authority to the contrary," the authority discussed by the cases hold-




Whether the one-year limitation of section 9(e) as applied to sec-
tion 10(b) claims is triggered by inquiry or actual discovery has
caused a bona fide circuit split. Though circuit splits are not un-
usual, the courts on both sides of this issue have relied on substan-
tially the same source material, but have arrived at opposite
conclusions."38 Most of the courts, for example, have used principles
of statutory construction to compare the distinctions among and be-
tween section 9(e) and its companion statutes (as the Lampf court
apparently intended); some find the distinctions dispositive, others
find them uncompelling.' 39 Many of the courts have analyzed the
problem by explicit or implicit reference to various equitable doc-
trines, again reaching variant results. 140
When courts rely on the same statutes and judicial language, but
reach opposite conclusions, the implication is that the fundamental
assumptions or methods of analysis are different. The better view
can be found through a careful analysis of those assumptions.
A. "'Significant Distinctions" and Statutory Construction
Now that the Lampf Court has designated section 9(e) as the gov-
erning limitative period for 1Ob-5 claims, the discovery standard is-
sue must turn on the analysis of section 9(e).
The first difficulty in analyzing section 9(e) is the scant body of
judicial interpretation of the section. Section 9(e) is invoked only in-
frequently. 4' One reason is that Rule lOb-5 actions have for various
reasons traditionally been more appealing to plaintiffs than actions
137. Digital Microwave, [1992 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH)
97,044, at 94,596.
138. See discussion supra part II.
139. Id.
140. Id.
141. In his dissent in Lampf Justice Kennedy referred to § 9 as a "rarely used
remedy." Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2789 (1991)
(Kennedy, J., dissenting).
under section 9.142 As a result, the statute has not spent much time
in the crucible of judicial decisionmaking and reasoning.
There are, consequently, no reported opinions concerning the dis-
covery standard for section 9(e) as applied to section 9 claims. One
case, Rosenberg v. Hano,14 3 is erroneously digested as requiring
some diligence for discovery under section 9(e). 44 Actually, the Ro-
senberg court expressly declined to interpret section 9(e) and held
only that section 13 requires diligence for discovery. 145
The Rosenberg court's analysis is nevertheless instructive because
it presages the discovery standard conflict. The plaintiff in that case
brought claims under section 9 of the 1934 Act. Reviewing the facts,
the court noted that the plaintiff's cause of action lay not in section 9
but in section 12 of the 1933 Act, which is governed by the limita-
tions period in section 13.146
In passing, the court noted that both section 13 and section 9(e)
"implement the common law doctrine of time limitation in cases of
fraud," which "requires that reasonable diligence be used toward
discovering the fraud after the transaction is completed.' 47 How-
ever, the court noted the problematic distinction between the
sections:
This [diligence] requirement although omitted in [section 9(e)] was in-
cluded in the express language of [section 13]. Had the plaintiff-appellant
been able to bring himself within the terms of the former as he attempted,
we should have had to consider a complicated question in statutory con-
struction. It would have turned on the theoretical intention of a legislative
body which earlier expressly recognized a rule of law and later omitted the
recognition. 14 8
The Rosenberg court, then, did not hold that section 9(e) is triggered
by inquiry notice. Instead, that court recognized very early what
courts today are just discovering: (1) that the express language of
section 9(e) does not include a provision for inquiry discovery, (2)
that some other federal securities limitations, most notably section
13, are expressly triggered when the discovery should have been
142. Rule lob-5 covers a larger class of defendants and securities, and is not sub-ject to certain procedural restrictions enumerated in § 9, including the security for ex-
penses provision and, formerly, the shorter limitations period. See 5 JACOBS, supra note
17, § 302[c] at 1-106 to -107.
143. 121 F.2d 818 (3d Cir. 1941).
144. The headnote and digest entry imply that the court held that section 9(c)
requires that reasonable diligence be used toward discovering fraud after a transaction is
completed. See 15 U.S.C.S. § 78i(e) (Law. Co-op. 1993); 15 U.S.C.A. § 78i(e) (West
1993).
145. Rosenberg, 121 F.2d at 821.
146. Id. "[P]laintiff erroneously brought this action under Section 9 .... His
cause of action is not one contemplated by this provision .... The statutory remedy,
therefore, if one exists, is provided not by this Section, but by Section 12 .... ." Id.
147. Id.
148. Id.
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made by reasonable diligence, and (3) that these distinctions be-
tween section 9(e) and section 13 might imply different diligence re-
quirements for those sections.
The Lampf Court explicitly endorsed this approach. That Court
was faced only with selecting a limitations period: the Court did not
differentiate the various one- and three-year sections except "[t]o the
extent that these distinctions in the future might prove signifi-
cant."' 49 As such, the court clearly contemplated that future analysis
of section 9(e) would be accomplished in part by reference to its
companion sections and that the distinctions in terminology could be
important.
The problem now, as the Rosenberg court noted, is determining
the intention of Congress concerning the discovery standard for sec-
tion 9(e) in light of the distinctions between section 13 and section
9(e). That would be a simple task if the legislative history of section
9(e) revealed a stated congressional preference for inquiry or actual
notice. Unfortunately, it does not.150
Notwithstanding this lack of express legislative intent, courts ad-
dressing this issue have devined a theoretical intent by reference to
the statutory distinctions. Accordingly, most courts and commenta-
tors have construed the apparent omission in section 9(e), in light of
the presence of diligence requirements in other sections, to exclude a
diligence requirement. 151
In so holding, those authorities actually have applied two separate
149. Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, et al. v. Gilbertson, 111 S. Ct. 2773, 2782 (1991).
Each of the courts addressing the discovery standard issue since Lampf has addressed
this language, either finding it irrelevant or finding it to be an indication of Supreme
Court intent that the distinctions be given effect to mean actual discovery.
150. See HAROLD S. BLOOMENTHAL, SECURITIES LAW HANDBOOK § 30.02, at 30-
15 (1993 ed.). Bloomenthal explains:
Congress amended Section 13 at the time it adopted the Exchange Act in order
to conform Section 13 with the Exchange Act limitations. The difference in
language appears to be an oversight. The debate relating to the adoption of
these provisions does not refer to the difference or recognize its possible
significance.
Id. Still, Bloomenthal asserts that the debate over the provisions assumed that actual
discovery (or something very close) would be required. Thus the oversight was in retain-
ing an unduly stringent discovery standard in § 13, not in failing to include inquiry notice
in § 9(e). Id. at 30-16.
151. See discussion supra part II. See also 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.02, at
10-43 (noting statutory distinctions and concluding that "[t]he one-year period com-
mences when the plaintiff 'discover[s] . . . the facts constituting the violation' rather
than when he knew or should have known of the fraud."); MARC I. STEINBERG, SECURI-
TIES REGULATION: LIABILITIES AND REMEDIES § 7.08[2] at 7-30 (1992)("Hence, based
on the language of Section 9(e), for the one year period to begin running with respect to
Section 10(b) limitations purposes, the plaintiff must have actual knowledge.").
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rules of statutory construction. First, they have compared the lan-
guage of one statute of limitations against another. Second, in light
of this comparison, the absence of parallel language is supposed to
indicate a congressional intent that the two statutes be construed dif-
ferently.152 The first step, comparing similar statutes to note the pos-
sible significance of differences, is a legitimate application of
statutory construction, provided that the two statutes were meant to
be construed together, (and thus, against each other) .53 Such stat-
utes are said to be in pari materia.54
It is clear that the 1933 and 1934 Acts are in pari materia, and
are therefore meant to be construed together. 5 As such, the notion
that Congress intended the omission of an express diligence require-
ment to be significant becomes much more plausible. This is particu-
larly so when Congress might expect a court to find the omission
significant, and Congress, knowing that the statutes may be con-
strued against each other, should expect that the omission will be
found to be significant. 156
The action Congress has taken implies that section 9(e) is not
meant to be triggered by the inquiry notice that triggers section 13,
but rather by actual discovery. On the very same day it enacted the
1934 Act, including its limitations provision in 9(e), Congress
amended the limitations provisions of the 1933 act, shortening them
from their two- and ten-year structure to the current one- and three-
year structure.1 57 Congress did not then take the opportunity to
152. 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, SUTHERLAND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 51.02,
at 122-23 (1992).
153. 3 id. §§ 51.01-.03.
154. Id. § 51.03
155. See, e.g., Axelrod & Co. v. Kordich, Victor & Neufeld, 451 F.2d 838 (2d
Cir. 1971) (1933 and 1934 Acts are in pari materia, and are meant to be construed
together); United States v. Zelker, 335 F. Supp. 85 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (same); Brown v.
Gilligan, Will & Co., 287 F. Supp. 766 (S.D.N.Y. 1968) (same). See also Lampf, 111 S.
Ct. at 2781 (limitations periods in Acts of 1933 and 1934 are "[e]ach an integral ele-
ment of a complex web of regulations ... intended to facilitate a central goal.")
156. 2B SINGER, supra note 152, § 51.02, at 122-23.
[I]f words used in a prior statute to express a certain meaning are omitted, it
will be presumed that a change of meaning was intended. Thus it has been said
"where a statute, with reference to one subject contains a given provision, the
omission of such provision from a similar statute concerning a related subject is
significant to show that a different intention existed.
Id. (quoting Western States Newspapers, Inc. v. Gehringer, 203 Cal. App. 2d 793, 22
Cal. Rptr. 144 (1962), and citing Water Quality Ass'n. v. United States, 795 F.2d 1303
(7th Cir. 1986)).
Some authority suggests that the possible rationale for the bifurcated requirement is
found in the "strict liability" nature of sections 11 and 12(2), for which liability may be
shown without a showing of fault. See Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J. dissent-
ing) See also Lobis Loss, FUNDAMENTALS OF SECURITIES REGULATION 901-903, 919-23
(2d ed. 1988) (comparing sections 11 and 12(2) with section 9).
157. See Ceres Partners v. GEL Associates, 918 F.2d 349, 363 (2d Cir. 1990)
(discussing the legislative history of the Acts and their amendments).
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equate the discovery standards of the two sections, either by elimi-
nating the diligence requirement in section 13, or by including an
inquiry notice and diligence requirement in section 9(e) .158 This
point creates a very strong foundation for giving effect to the differ-
ent language of the sections.
159
Further, despite Congress' quick response in overturning the retro-
active effect of Lampf, Congress did not take the same opportunity
to reject section 9(e) as an unsuitable limitation for 10(b) claims and
replacing it with an express limitation with express triggers. 80 Nor
did Congress take the opportunity to indicate expressly that section
9(e) is triggered by inquiry notice for 10(b) claims.' 6' This observa-
tion is significant because, at the time of the enaction of the legisla-
tion, the Gruber and Hauman courts had already decided that actual
notice is required.'" 2 Again, congressional silence in light of judicial
construction is solid evidence of congressional approval of the
approach. 63
Some authorities cast doubt upon the reliability of the "silence as
ratification" approach to statutory construction. 64 On this issue,
however, Congress has now considered the limitative periods twice:
once when it amended the 1933 limitative periods and enacted the
1934 limitative periods, and again when it drafted the post-Lampf
158. Id.
159. 2B SINGER, supra note 152, § 51.03, at 140 ("[T]he rule that statutes in pari
materia should be construed together has the greatest probative force, in the case of
statutes relating to the same subject matter passed at the same session of the legislature,
especially if they were passed or approved or take effect on the same day . ").
160. Section 476 of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act
of 1991, Pub. Law 102-242, 105 Stat. 2236 (1991), adds a new section to section 27A of
the Exchange Act. The law essentially overrules the retroactive application of the Lampf
decision for suits already filed before Lampf. Id.
161. See id.
162. Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 947 F.2d 897 (10th Cir. 1991), vacated,
112 S. Ct. 1658 (1992), is the only case decided before the legislation holding otherwise.
It was decided less than two months before the signing of the legislation.
163. 2B SINGER, supra note 152, § 49.10, at 76-77 (legislative inaction following
contemporaneous and practical interpretation is some evidence that the legislature in-
tended to adopt the judicial interpretation).
164. See Kaulbach, supra note 26, at 155-57. Kaulbach wrote:
[I]t is generally acknowledged that it is much easier to kill a bill than to pass
one. Congress may find the matter too trivial to deserve attention, or may ig-
nore it simply out of inertia. Congress may, in fact, have no strong preference
on the issue and thus will acquiesce to any judicial rule. Alternatively, mem-
bers of Congress may disagree with the judicial rule but find themselves unable
to agree on a particular alternative. Moreover, the silent acquiescence of a sub-
sequent Congress in the interpretation of a statute is not probative of the origi-
nal, enacting Congress' intent.
Id.
legislation. Hence, the objections to construing congressional silence
as approval are blunted.
Absent further clarification by Congress, courts should observe the
distinctions in the statutory language and give effect to the apparent
difference. This approach is the most consonant with principles of
statutory construction, and gives meaning to the Lampf Court's ob-
servation that the distinctions may be significant. Should Congress
disapprove, it may act to equate the sections.
B. Equitable Doctrines - Tolling And Discovery
Notwithstanding the force of the above analysis, some courts have
avoided the conclusion that section 9(e) is triggered only by actual
notice by declaring that the determination is governed by the "gen-
eral" federal rule that discovery means inquiry discovery.
That approach is, after Lampf, demonstrably erroneous. The an-
swer to the problem is found in the distinction between the pre-
Lampf use of the state "borrowing" doctrine and the post-Lampf use
of federal law limitations.
It is entirely true that courts for many years applied a general
"discovery rule" or "equitable tolling" to 10b-5 limitations, and that
the rule generally requires diligence of the plaintiff. 165 Under the
rule, state law supplied the limitative period, but federal law gov-
erned when and how the period ran.' Thus, the discovery rule man-
dated that the period began upon inquiry discovery, regardless of the
specific language of the state statute.16 7 This is undoubtedly the
165. 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.03, at 10-50. "Under the pre-1991 law, the
general rule is that the temporal period, which is adopted from the forum state's law,
begins to run when the plaintiff knew or should have known of the fraud. This principle
is sometimes called the federal tolling doctrine." Id.
166. Id. § 235.02, at 10-15 to -16. Jacobs explains:
State law does not determine when the period begins to run or what events
interrupt the period. Nor does a federal court adopt the state statute's proce-
dural substantive nuances. A lob-5 plaintiff therefore does not have to make a
tender within the period specified by the state statute of limitations. In short,
the state supplies only the measuring period-i.e., a specific number of years.
Id. (footnotes omitted). See also 2 CORMAN, supra note 1, § 9.7.1, at 66. Corman
explains:
When a federal statute does not contain its own statute of limitations, the fed-
eral courts frequently borrow the most applicable statute of the forum jurisdic-
tion; federal law applies, however, in determining when that borrowed statute
accrues. Courts consider the doctrine of equitable tolling when fraudulent con-
cealment exists, but the limitations statute is tolled only when the requisite
diligence by the plaintiff is established.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
167. 5D JACOBS. supra note 17, § 235.03, at 10-52. Jacobs further explains:
The point at which the statutory period would begin under state law is irrele-
vant. This question is controlled by the federal tolling doctrine. Thus, even if
the state statute specifies that the period commences on the date of the transac-
tion, a judge in a lOb-5 case will apply the federal tolling doctrine and adopt
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source of the Anixter and Manning courts' conclusions that the
"general rule" for triggering 1Ob-5 limitations incorporates inquiry
discovery.168
Under the borrowing doctrine, this rule ameliorated the problems
caused by the use of diverse state limitations in federal courts. A
relatively uniform body of federal law governing how and when the
limitations ran aided consistency and discouraged forum shopping.16 9
Courts and litigants were spared the task of ascertaining and apply-
ing the diverse substantive law of state limitations.
However, as the Werner court discerned, the doctrine does not ap-
ply to the one-year limitation from section 9(e)."1 0 Now that there is
a uniform federal period, there is no need for a unifying federal eq-
uitable rule to govern when the statutory period is triggered. The
discovery rule has been supplanted by the express requirements of
section 9(e). 17 Thus the general federal discovery rule is applicable
only in the pre-Lampf cases in which a federal court borrowed the
limitations period from a state statute.
It follows from the above discussion that a borrowed state limita-
tive period would be triggered by inquiry notice even if the state
statute were identical to section 9(e). That is, prior to Lampf, a
court would properly disregard any apparent actual discovery provi-
sion in favor of the general federal discovery rule. After Lampf,
courts consider the requirements of the statute instead of the general
federal rule. One mistake of the Anixter, Berning, and Manning
courts, then, can be described as undue deference to a venerable but
inapplicable rule.
Still, some courts have asserted that the equitable tolling and dis-
covery doctrines are somehow incorporated into section 9(e) in their
entirety, including a diligence standard, because of the reference to
discovery. In the view of these courts, the entire equitable tolling
only the time period from the state statute.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
168. See Anixter v. Home-Stake Prod. Co., 947 F.2d 897, 899 n.5 (10th Cir.
1991); Manning v. Maloney, 787 F. Supp 433, 436 (M.D. Pa. 1992).
169. 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.03, at 10-52.
170. See supra notes 129-133 and accompanying text.
171. 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.03, at 10-84. Jacobs further explains:
In interpreting the "should have known" branch of the pre-1991 federal tolling
doctrine, judges had held that: courts will not await leisurely discovery of the
full details and the claimant has to be able to recognize the fraud or at least
the possibility of fraud. These guidelines are inapplicable after Lampf, since
the query now is when the plaintiff discovers the fraud not when he knew or
should have known of (or should have discovered) the violation.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
rule is incorporated or "built in" to section 9(e). This argument,
however, encounters two problems.
First, the Lampf Court itself dismissed this approach in its own
analysis of section 9(e). Because the Lampf Court found tolling "un-
necessary" for the one-year limitation in section 9(e), the most rea-
sonable construction is that the Court believed determinations of
diligence unnecessary because the period does not begin until the ac-
tual discovery of the facts.1 72 If the plaintiff actually discovers the
facts - whether diligently or not - the period begins and cannot be
tolled because the plaintiff already knows the facts. If the plaintiff
does not actually know the facts, the period does not begin to run,
and therefore it does not need tolling - the defendant cannot rely
upon it anyway.
In light of this analysis, it might be said that the essential aspect
of the equitable tolling doctrine - that the period does not run until
discovery - is present in section 9(e). It might also be said and that
tolling is "built in" to section 9(e) because the period does not run
until discovery. But to say that equitable tolling is "built in" to the
statute is not to say that Congress built in the entire complement of
elements associated with the doctrine into the statute. Though courts
will apparently consider an inquiry standard for section 9(e), courts
would not routinely consider importing other requirements associated
with the equitable tolling doctrine into section 9(e) unless it was evi-
dent that the statute required them to do so. 173
The second problem with the notion that section 9(e) incorporates
inquiry notice by its reference to discovery is that it causes the ex-
press discovery standard in section 13 to be mere surplusage. In
other words, if Congress intended to incorporate an inquiry discovery
standard into section 9(e) by reference to bare "discovery," why
would it modify "discovery" in section 13 with an express inquiry
standard? That interpretation of section 9(e) rests on the uncomfort-
able assumption that Congress was redundant in section 13.
Accordingly, there is no reason to conclude that equitable doc-
trines or federal common law demand an inquiry discovery standard
172. See discussion supra part I.C.
173. Some jurisdictions, for example, require plaintiffs to plead active fraudulent
concealment under the equitable tolling doctrine. 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.03, at
10-74 to 75. See also 2 COMAN, supra note 1, § 9.7.1, at 63-64. Corman states that
under the equitable tolling doctrine:
A plaintiff who challenges the use of the statute of limitations as a defense to
his or her claim must affirmatively plead and prove fraudulent concealment in
order to toll the running of the statute on this basis .... [I]n some jurisdic-
tions the plaintiff also must show that the defendant intended to keep the plain-
tiff ignorant of the wrongful conduct.
Id. (footnotes omitted). No court, however, has considered requiring this sort of pleading
and proof under the provisions of section 9(e).
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for section 9(e). After Lampf, the equitable tolling rule and its at-
tendant inquiry standard are not applicable and thus do not support
inquiry notice for section 9(e). The mere reference to discovery in
section 9(e) does not indicate a diligence standard, particularly in
light of the express diligence standard in section 13.
C. Practical Considerations
Putting aside the legal reasoning supporting an actual notice stan-
dard for section 9(e), how does the outcome of the issue affect the
practicalities of 1Ob-5 litigation and the general policies of the secur-
ities acts? Do practical considerations support either actual or in-
quiry notice for section 9(e)?
Most of the practical objections to an inquiry notice requirement
for section 9(e) arise as a result of 9(e) as a whole being generally
too short. The one-year limitation provision is relatively short com-
pared with prior state law,374 and compared to the five-year provision
urged by the agency in charge of administering the Acts, the Securi-
ties Exchange Commission. 75 In seeking to effectuate federal policy,
the Lampf court may inadvertently have frustrated it.
Securities fraud is hard to detect. Consider Justice Kennedy's ob-
servation in Lampf that "[t]he practical and legal obstacles to bring-
ing a private §10(b) action are significant . . . The real burden on
most investors, however, is the initial matter of discovering whether
a violation of the securities laws occurred at all.""76 Even with an
actual discovery standard, plaintiffs who are able to beat the three-
year period of repose will probably have to litigate whether they
should be barred by the one-year limitation - even in cases of egre-
gious (but well-concealed) fraud. 77
174. State blue sky laws are typically two years. Limitations for fraud range from
one to ten years. 2 CORMAN, supra note 1 § 4.3.3.
175. Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at 2778 (five-year limitation "promises to yield the best
practical and policy results in Rule lOb-5 litigation").
176. Lampf 111 S. Ct. at 2789 (Kennedy, J., dissenting). Justice Kennedy noted
that because concealment is inherent in most securities fraud cases, even "sophisticated
investors may not be able to discover the fraud until long after its perpetration." Id.
(citing ABA Report, supra note 22, at 654). See also Dean Foust, Don't Shorten the
Deadline on Investors' Lawsuits, Bus. WEEK, Jan. 13, 1992, at 36, 36 ("The time is
needed because securities-fraud cases are often maddeningly complex. It takes time to
discover that fraud occurred, let alone develop a case. Even the [S.E.C.] with its sub-
poena powers, needed more than three years . . . until it began proceedings against
Drexel and E.F. Hutton.").
177. See, e.g., Richard Roberts, Gridlock on Securities Law, LEGAL TIMES, Feb. 3,
1992, at 22, 25.("Given today's complex securities transactions, three years is not a par-
ticularly long time to conceal fraudulent activity .... Lampf may, perversely, reward
Would an inquiry standard give plaintiffs necessary incentives to
diligence? An inquiry notice provision would unquestionably give
plaintiffs additional incentives to investigate and file prospective suits
promptly, but are those incentives necessary? Plaintiffs already have
incentives to investigate promptly to expand the causes of action and
to provide leverage in settlement negotiations. Further, Rule 11 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure already requires plaintiffs to
investigate before filing lawsuits. 118
Worse, between Rule 11 and a short limitative period triggered by
inquiry notice, plaintiffs will often be stuck between risking what
may be a frivolous suit filed timely on skimpy facts, and spending
time investigating further on the chance that the short fuse may be
running and later bar a legitimate action.179
On a broader scale, an unduly stringent discovery standard, cou-
pled with the comparatively short one- and three-year period, will
undoubtedly frustrate the private enforcement of the securities laws.
Though some unmeritorious claims may be filtered out by a shorter
period and strict discovery standard, an untold number of meritori-
ous suits will be discarded on technical grounds. The SEC has al-
ways relied on vigorous private enforcement of the securities laws as
an indispensible aid in securities regulation. 180 If the brevity of the
existing limitations period already hampers private enforcement, the
incremental difficulty caused by an inquiry notice standard can only
exacerbate the problem.
the most blameworthy connivers: those clever enough to mask the fraud for only three
years.").
178. FED. R. Civ. P. 11. See also Mohammed v. Union Carbide Corp., 606 F.
Supp. 252, 261 (E.D. Mich. 1985). However, an impending limitative bar lessens the
degree of investigation required, unless plaintiff's counsel is responsible for the undue
delay. Costello v. Daddario, 710 F. Supp. 1035, 1038 (E.D. Pa. 1989); cf. Southern
Leasing Partners, Ltd. v. McMullan, 801 F.2d 783, 788 (5th Cir. 1986); Cabell v. Petty,
810 F.2d 463, 466 (4th Cir. 1987).
179. See, e.g., BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 150, § 30.02, at 30-17. "Although dila-
tory behavior by counsel should not be encouraged, it appears inconsistent with the obli-
gation to have a reasonable basis for filing a complaint for counsel to proceed at the
client's peril to attempt to determine whether such a basis exists before filing the action."
Id.; see also Foust, supra note 176 (commenting on Lampf decision and proposing that
power of judges to sanction lawsuits provides ample protection against frivolous suits,
justifying a longer statute of limitations).
180. Both the S.E.C. and the U.S. Supreme Court have consistently affirmed the
value of private enforcement of the securities laws. See J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S
426 (1964)(private enforcement is a necessary supplement to S.E.C. action because it
affords relief to defrauded investors and deters future wrongdoing); Mills v. Electric
Auto-Lite Co., 396 U.S. 375, 396-97 (1970); Berner v. Lazzaro, 730 F.2d 1319 (9th Cir.
1984), a.f'd sub nom. Bateman Eichler, Hill Richards, Inc. v. Berner, 472 U.S. 299
(1985). See also Roberts, supra note 177, at 25 ("Although Lampf may, in a clumsy
fashion, reduce both meritorious and meritless private securities litigation, it also signifi-
cantly weakens the protection from fraud to which investors are accustomed, arguably to
the detriment of our capital formation process.").
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It is possible that the one- and three-year period, especially if trig-
gered by inquiry notice, will decrease the volume of private securities
litigation in the federal courts. Even assuming the wisdom of this
goal, there are two flaws with the argument.
First, even if some federal securities suits are barred by the short
limitations, many of those suits will instead be brought to state
courts with longer limitations periods and more favorable substantive
law. 81 The cases that the federal courts are spared will impact the
state courts. Second, in federal courts, litigants will still have to en-
gage in diligence analyses laden with factual issues.182 An actual dis-
covery determination is much less complex than an inquiry discovery
determination, s3 and is therefore presumably much less costly to
litigate.
This additional cost might be defensible if an inquiry discovery
standard advanced some legitimate interest of defendants. What
about defendants' interest in repose and protection from stale
claims? The discovery standard issue does not really bear on the
problems truly faced by defendants: because the new statutory
scheme already provides short periods, defendants will not get much
of an incremental benefit from inquiry notice. Even under an actual
discovery standard, no claim could endure one year beyond actual
discovery, and in no case could a claim endure beyond three years.184
Within these brief periods, can any claim reasonably be considered
"stale" in the 1Ob-5 context in light of the difficulty in discovering
securities fraud? Can "wily" plaintiffs hope to benefit much from
causing a protracted period between the harm and the suit?
All of this suggests that an inquiry notice provision for section
9(e) would benefit neither defendants nor the judicial system as a
whole very much. It would, however, add an unnecessary obstacle to
181. "Hence, plaintiffs increasingly may resort to the state courts for relief ....
In view of the judgments rendered and settlements reached in some of these state court
actions, the Supreme Court's decision in Lampf in the end may not spell such good news
for defendants." STEINBERG, supra note 151, § 7.08[3], at 7-32 to -33 (footnotes
omitted).
182. 5D JACOBS, supra note 17, § 235.03, at 10-59 to -77 (detailing the differences
between actual notice and inquiry notice determinations and noting the relative cqmplex-
ity of the latter).
183. Id.
184. See, e.g. BLOOMENTHAL, supra note 150, § 30.02, at 30-15 ("It is not inap-
propriate to hold the plaintiff to a high standard of care when the statute will run indefi-
nitely until he discovers the fraud; it is another matter if there is an outside period within
which the action must be brought in any event.").
plaintiffs already facing a strict limitations period and thereby frus-
trate the effective enforcement of the securities laws. Even if the rel-
ative costs and benefits offset each other, the greater complexity and
costs of the inquiry notice determination spoil its utility. Put bluntly,
finding the distinction between "whether plaintiffs should have
known" and "when plaintiffs actually knew" is not worth the costs
imposed on litigants and courts in the excercise.
Still, most of the practical problems are caused by the brevity of
section 9(e) as a whole. As such, Congress might do well to revisit
the statute of limitations problem to resolve all of the concerns -
including the discovery standard issue - at one time.185
III. CONCLUSION
Absent Congressional action or Supreme Court clarification,
courts should not read inquiry notice into section 9(e) as applied to
10(b) claims. The chief appeal of the inquiry notice approach is its
apparent deference to prior common law and equitable rules. This
deference is misplaced.
Holding that only actual notice triggers the one-year limitation, on
the other hand, is a proper exercise of statutory construction princi-
ples; it acknowledges the statutory distinctions, and gives effect to
the Lampf language selecting section 9(e) and distinguishing it from
other sections. Further, it is consistent with the present application
(or nonapplication) of equitable principles to section 9(e). Finally, it
better serves the policy concerns inherent in the securities acts with-
out confounding the policy concerns addressed by limitative periods.
POSTSCRIPT
As this article went to page proofs, the Seventh Circuit Court of
Appeals rendered an important decision on the discovery standard
issue. In Tregenza v. Great American Communications Co., 8' the
court held that the one-year limitations period for Rule 1Ob-5 claims
is triggered by inquiry notice.187 The case demands scrutiny because
the court's reasoning is novel and because the court's holding con-
flicts markedly with the holding of the Lampf court.
185. See, e.g., Roberts, supra note 177, at 25 ("Congress should substitute a more
reasonable two-year/five-year limitations period for the one-year/three-year rule."); 5D
JAcoBs, supra note 17, § 235.02, at 10-39 (recommending that Congress adopt a two-
and six-year limitations period for lOb-5 actions).
186. [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) % 98,010, at 98,265 (7th Cir.
1993).
187. Overruling, sub silentio, Hauman v. Illinois Power Co., [1992 Transfer
Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 96,882 at 93,600 (C.D. I11. Aug. 29, 1991). That the
court did not refer to the extensive treatment of this topic in the Hauman case is puz-
zling. See supra notes 89-101 and accompanying discussion.
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Remarkably, the Tregenza court held that section 9(e) is triggered
only by actual notice.188 The court contrasted the language of section
9(e) to that of section 13, and acknowledged that the Supreme Court
chose section 9(e), and not section 13, to govern Rule 10b-5
claims.189 Nevertheless, the court declined to apply the letter of sec-
tion 9(e). In a complex mosaic of reasoning, the court devined a
Congressional intent that Rule lOb-5 limitations be triggered by in-
quiry notice regardless of the language of the governing statute.9 '
First, the court asserted that Congress, because it did not know
about Rule 1Ob-5 actions when it enacted the 1934 Act, could not
have meant to foreclose inquiry notice for Rule 1Ob-5 suits. 1 ' As an
example of this lack of intent, the court indicated that Congress' ac-
tual approach to securities fraud suits like those under Rule 10b-5 is
best discerned in section 13 because section 13 provides the limita-
tive period for actions more similar to Rule 10b-5 suits than claims
under section 9:
When Congress knew it was dealing with a statute of limitations for fraud,
as in section 13 of the 1933 Act, it took care to provide for inquiry notice
explicitly. . . . Sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act, on the one hand,
and rule lOb-5 under the 1934 Act, on the other, differ only in details. 92
The court proceeded from these premises to the apparent conclu-
sion that because Congress did not know that section 9(e) would
later be used for Rule 10b-5 actions, it would depend upon courts to
apply inquiry notice, by reference to other more analogous provisions
188. Tregenza, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,267. "Section
9(e), read literally, requires actual knowledge to set the statute of limitations running.
The plaintiff must know 'the facts constituting the violation,' not merely enough facts to
make a reasonable person suspicious and start looking for the facts constituing the viola-
tion." The holding is remarkable because prior courts, when holding that § 9(e) is trig-
gered by inquiry notice, denied that the section is itself triggered by actual notice. See
supra notes 102-25 and accompanying text.
189. Id.
190. Id. at 95,268.
191. Id. The court stated:
Congress could not have known when it enacted section 9(e) that this section
would someday provide the statute of limitations for a wide range of securities
frauds unrelated to the market manipulations forbidden by section 9 .... It is
an impermissible leap to infer that Congress decided that inquiry notice should
not be a feature of suits brought to enforce the as yet unforeseen Rule lob-5.
Id.
This reasoning is alluring because of the undeniable truth of its premise: Congress
could not have known in enacting section 9(e) that the Supreme Court would eventually
apply it to a right of action that did not exist at the time. And, of course, Congress could
not then have decided that inquiry notice should not be a feature of Rule 10b-5 suits; the
conceptual leap is "impermissible" because it is impossible.
192. Id.
like section 13, in spite of section 9(e). 193 Further, because Congress
did not expressly foreclose inquiry notice for Rule 10b-5 suits, courts
are free to apply the "judge-made doctrine of inquiry notice," em-
boldened by Congress' express recognition of inquiry notice in sec-
tion 13.194 The court insisted that its approach was not repugnant to
the language of section 9(e): "Nothing in the language, history, or
purpose of section 9(e) forecloses so modest and traditional an exer-
cise of judicial creativity."'195
The first flaw in the court's argument is that the premises are
highly questionable. Sections 11 and 12(2) of the 1933 Act, to which
section 13 applies, do not really impose liability for fraud as does
section 9 of the 1934 Act.196 Section 9, for example, has much more
rigorous requirements for reliance and causation than do sections 11
and 12(2). 197 More importantly, unlike common law fraud or actions
under sections 9 and 10 of the 1934 Act, liability may be shown
under sections 11 and 12(2) without proof of scienter.' 8 Because
actions under sections 11 and 12(2) are less like fraud actions than
actions under section 9, it is inconsistent to say that Congress was
"dealing with a statute of limitations for fraud" when it enacted sec-
tion 13. For the same reason, it is also inconsistent to imply that
Congress was not dealing with a statute of limitations for fraud
when it enacted section 9(e) because section 9 is actually a better
analogue for fraud and Rule 10b-5 actions than sections 11 and
12(2). 1 9
The second flaw in the court's argument is even more fundamen-
tal: the conclusion contravenes Lampf. The Lampf court faced,
among other issues, the question of which federal statutory analogue,
if any, provides the best limitative period for Rule lOb-5 claims.200
That court unequivocally declared that the language from section
9(e), and not section 13 or any other section, governs Rule lob-5
actions.2 0' In its insistent reference to section 13 and Congress' his-
torical intent regarding fraud, the Tregenza court really only argued
193. According to the court, this conclusion is justified because Congress "plainly
believed [that] inquiry notice makes sense for fraud in the sale of stock. .. " and be-
cause Congress "did not know that section 9(e) of the 1934 Act would someday be appli-
cable to the same type of fraud claim for which section 13 of the 1933 Act supplied the
limitations period." Id. at 98,268.
194. Id.
195. Id.
196. See generally Loss, supra note 156, at 883-900.
197. See id. at 902, 921-22.
198. Id. at 902: "Scienter, the hobgoblin of both common law deceit and Rule
10b-5, is foreign to the vocabulary of §11 just as in the case of ... §12(2)." Id. This
point led Professor Loss to observe that the requirements of § 11 "sound more in negli-
gence than in fraud." Id.
199. See supra notes 37-38, 47-50, 156 and accompanying text.
200. See supra part I.C.
201. See supra notes 68-69.
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that section 13 might be a better theoretical analogue for the source
of Rule 10b-5 limitations." 2 That assertion is dubious,203 but the
question is moot: the Lampf court selected section 9(e) over section
13, and Congress has not disturbed that holding despite ample op-
portunity to do so. 20 4
The Tregenza court's reasoning would be more persuasive if the
Lampf Court had directed lower courts to the one- and three-year
periods generally without selecting a particular section, or if section
9(e) did not include an express discovery standard.2 0 5 But the Lampf
Court declined to invite the judiciary to a statutory buffet. By speci-
fying section 9(e) instead of being content to refer to all of the one-
and three-year periods generally, the Lampf Court surely intended to
prevent precisely this sort of litigation and speculation over the dif-
fering language in the broad spectrum of one- and three-year
periods.
Though the Tregenza court's statutory analysis does not seem to
support the court's outright defiance of Lampf, the court also prof-
fered a practical reason to reject actual notice. The court rejected
the assertion that the existence of the three-year period of repose, by
providing a strict outside limit on claims, assuages concerns about an
actual notice standard. 0 8 The court posited that an actual notice
202. That the court took this position is not surprising; the Seventh Circuit had,
before Lampf, identified § 13 as the most analogous statutory provision in Belleville
Shoe. See supra notes 39-46.
203. See supra notes 196-99 and accompanying text.
204. See supra notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
205. The Tregenza court asserted that legislatures often do not incorporate express
accrual and tolling standards because they are secure in the knowledge that courts will
"graft" such provisions onto the statute: "Rules making the accrual date the date of
discovery, of which actual knowledge and inquiry notice are variants, usually are judicial
grafts." Tregenza, [Current Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) at 98,268. This point is
irrelevant; § 9(e), by the Tregenza court's own admission, has an accrual standard mani-
festly based on actual discovery. Id. at 98,267. The question, then, is not whether courts
may effectuate or interpret the statute by reference to judge-made rules. Instead, the
question is whether a court may "graft" a doctrine onto § 9(e) that contravenes the
express language of that section.
206. Id. at 98,268. Once again, the court turned to § 13 for support:
The utility of inquiry notice and hence the propriety of our interpretation may
seem diminished by the presence of a three-year statute of repose. Not so -
for section 13 of the 1933 Act has the same three-year statute of repose yet
Congress wrote inquiry notice into the one-year statute of limitations in that
section.
Id. The relevance of this observation is questionable. That Congress chose to include
inquiry notice in § 13 (regardless of the period of repose) does not really seem to bear on
whether the existence of the period of repose in § 9(e) diminishes concerns about the
actual notice standard in § 9(e). The argument is that because there is a period of re-
pose, inquiry notice is not strictly necessary, as it presumably would be in the absence of
standard would allow suspicious investors to act "opportunistically"
by waiting to sue for up to three years while hoping for the stock to
regain its market' value:
Three years is an age in the stock market. If the suspicious investor had a
wide choice of times at which to sue within a three-year period rather than
being required to sue no more than one year after the earliest possible date,
the opportunistic use of federal securities law to protect investors against
market risk would be magnified.2 7
According to the court, these "suspicious" investors would have little
to lose by waiting to sue: "If the stock rebounded from the cellar
they would have investment profits, and if it stayed in the cellar they
would have legal damages. Heads I win, tails you lose."20 ,8
This reasoning is facially compelling because it seems to indicate
that an actual notice standard would allow investors who are merely
suspicious to use the securities law to play the market for up to three
years at the expense of prospective defendants. 0 9 On closer exami-
nation, however, it is unclear what sort of "opportunistic" behavior
the court is hoping to quell. The court's analysis is opaque, and sub-
ject to different interpretations.
In a broad sense, the court's analysis can be taken as an affirma-
tion of the idea that plaintiffs ought to investigate and bring suits
promptly. Certainly, an inquiry notice standard would induce plain-
tiffs to bring securities suits promptly. 210 But mere sloth is not oppor-
tunism, and the court's example is too complex to stand for the
simple proposition that the law ought to encourage promptness and
diligence to avoid stale claims.
Another possible interpretation is that the court hoped to prevent
plaintiffs from recovering for future price movements caused by mar-
ket risks unrelated to the original fraud. For example, suppose an
investor is defrauded, but delays suit. If the price of the stock later
rises, the investor decides not to sue. If the price falls, even if the
decline results from a market risk unrelated to the original fraud,
a period of repose because claims could endure for a long time before actual discovery.
Thus the existence of the repose period unquestionably removes one of the justifications
for inquiry notice. See supra notes 128, 184 and accompanying text. This is true regard-
less of what Congress choses to do in other sections.
207. Id. at 98,268.
208. Id.
209. Assuming, of course, that the suspicious investor is able to evade actual
knowledge for the entire three-year period (i.e., the investor must remain only "suspi-
cious" because once the investor actually knows of fraud - when suspicion turns to
knowledge - the one-year period begins). This may not be easy if disclosure is made, or
if the investigative and prosecutorial efforts of third parties or other shareholders "force"
actual knowledge upon the investor.
210. Too promptly, in fact. Inquiry notice may well increase the number of frivo-
lous suits because counsel may be pressed to file without sufficient investigation in order
to preserve the claim. This raises the specter of a different type of "opportunism" in the
securities fraud context-that of defendants. See supra notes 177-79.
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the investor sues and attempts to recover the subequent loss by at-
tributing it to the original fraud. The longer the plaintiff can stretch
the time for bringing the cause of action, the more price movements
can be "swept" under the cause of action.
This argument, however, assumes that plaintiffs may recover for
future price movements as part of their damages. This notion contra-
venes the standard rule of damages applied in Rule 1Ob-5 suits,
which usually does not allow recovery of future price declines, espe-
cially if they are unrelated to the fraud."" This problem would, then,
seem to be one of incorrect judicial application of damages law
rather than a problem to be solved by manipulating the limitative
period.
Yet another possible interpretation is that the suspicious investor
can use the cause of action as a hedge against future price fluctua-
tions. But surely the contingent existence of a theoretical fraud ac-
tion does not affect the future market risk to which the investor's
stock is exposed. Nor would the investor's decision to forestall inves-
tigation and suit affect those risks. 12 The suspicion or knowledge of
fraud in the abstract does not provide a means to play the market
without risk. 3
A more fundamental problem is evident in the court's analysis.
Even if the scenario described by the court were to occur, would it
really be of the "Heads I win, tails you lose" variety? Suppose the
investor suspects or knows of fraud, but delays suit. In the interim,
the price of the stock rises from factors unrelated to the fraud, in-
ducing the investor not to sue. Who is harmed? It is not the investor,
who has profited or at least limited his loss.214 It is certainly not the
211. See Bastian v. Petren Res. Co., 892 F.2d 680, 685 (7th Cir. 1990); See also
JAMES D. COX ET AL., SECURITIES REGULATION 813-14 (1991) ("The most common stan-
dard used in Rule lOb-5 cases is the tort-based out of pocket measure, which awards (to
a plaintiff-buyer) the difference between the amount paid for the security and its actual
value as of the time of the transaction."). For a general discussion of securities fraud
damages, see Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, Optimal Damages in Securi-
ties Cases, 52 U. Cm. L. REV. 611 (1985).
212. Except, possibly, to the extent that the filing of a lawsuit or the exposition of
fraud might drive the stock price down further. This does not seem to be the bagis for the
court's example, however.
213. That is, the merely "suspicious" investor could not be certain that "if [the
stock] stayed in the cellar [the investor] would have legal damages." The suspicions may
turn out to be unfounded, leaving the investor with no damages at all. Even if the inves-
tor knew of actual fraud, there is no guarantee that the investor will be able to maintain
suit to judgment or settlement, or that a judgment or settlement will fully compensate
the investor.
214. Arguably, the investor has been harmed. This point can be perceived intui-
tively: if fraud has "suppressed" the price of a particular firm's securities, those securities
prospective defendant, who has escaped a lawsuit for fraud. Courts,
certainly, will not be heard to complain if another securities fraud
suit is not brought to their attention. If the price of the stock does
not recover and the investor sues, the defendant cannot complain.
The court's example actually shows that investors who have a
longer time within which to bring a claim are ultimately less likely
to sue. First, the stock price may increase and induce the investor
not to sue at all. Second, the investor with more time to investigate
will be less likely to bring an unfounded action. If courts impose a
shorter period, therefore, investors will undoubtedly bring suits more
quickly to ensure compliance with the statute of limitations.21r They
will not, therefore, have the chance to be dissuaded by later market
advances or further investigation. It is then consistent to predict that
more suits, not less, will result from an inquiry notice standard.
In the end, no interpretation of the court's "opportunisrla" argu-
ment seems to imply that section 9(e) should not be triggered by
actual notice. Perhaps a future court will provide a more sublime
and consistent interpretation. As it stands, however, the court's sce-
nario seems destined for misinterpretation and misuse.
Near the end of 1993, it appeared that courts had generally
moved away from inquiry notice in favor of actual notice for section
9(e) as applied to Rule 1Ob-5 actions. Tregenza is a significant de-
parture from the trend toward consensus. That departure might be
welcome if the reasoning and analysis were correct and compelling
instead of merely "creative." But judicial creativity, however quaint
or innocuous, is no substitute for stare decisis and common sense.
CHARLES BENJAMIN NUTLEY
may not participate in the full appreciation accorded other similar stocks by market or
industry-wide price movements. Thus, as Judge Easterbrook has noted, "It is . . . quite
sensible to say that a plaintiff may allege that nondisclosure harmed investors because
the stock did not rise fast enough .. " Easterbrook & Fischel, supra note 211, at 630.
As a practical matter, however, recovery in these cases is rare because investors whose
stock has risen, even marginally, are unlikely to sue and, in any event, many courts
would likely be unsympathetic to the argument. See Id. at 644.
215. See supra note 210.
